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When Mogor dell’Amore returns from the Mundus Novus of the Americas 
to the court of the Mughal Emperor Akbar in Salman Rushdie’s The 
Enchantress of Florence, he brings with him fabulous tales of the “erratic 
nature” of time in “that half-uncharted territory.” Time, he says, “was 
completely out of control” (328). Not only does it speed up, slow down, 
and run “at different speeds for different people,” but there are periods 
“when it did not move at all” (328). “The locals,” dell’Amore relates, 
“confirmed that theirs was a world without change, a place of stasis, 
outside time” (328; emphasis in original). The Emperor Akbar, hearing 
of these contraventions of the laws of time, assumes that it must be a 
fundamental oddity of the West, in contrast to the prosaic and predict-
able behaviour of temporality in the East. “[T]he lands of the West,” 
he thinks, “were exotic and surreal to a degree incomprehensible to the 
humdrum people of the East,” where people “worked hard, lived well or 
badly, died noble or ignoble deaths, believed in faiths that engendered 
great art, great poetry, great music, some consolation, and much confu-
sion. Normal human lives, in sum” (329). 
 In this exchange between the Eastern emperor and his emissary to 
the exotic West, Rushdie whimsically reverses age-old Orientalist de-
pictions of the “timeless time of the East,” which relegated the Orient 
to a static zone of temporal otherness outside of the linear progression 
of history. The “imaginative, quasi-fictional quality” of Orientalist de-
scriptions of the time and history of the East, as Edward Said writes, 
dramatized the distance and difference between familiar and unfamil-
iar spaces (55). While reaffirming the normalcy of the laws of time at 
home, these Orientalist depictions of exotic temporality also invited 
Western intervention into lands locked in mythical stasis. The job of 
the colonizer involved, in part, introducing time to places formerly 
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untouched by it or erratically resistant to it. Rushdie, again reversing 
the polarities of Orientalism such that the East becomes the site of a 
“humdrum” ordinary temporality and the West the place of temporal ir-
regularity and instability, mimics the Orientalist view that time control 
and regulation were purely an imported product of the colonizer. “It 
was possible, and there were philosophers who argued the point vocifer-
ously,” he writes, “that time had been brought to Mundus Novus by the 
European voyagers and settlers, along with various diseases. That was 
why it didn’t work properly. It had not yet adapted to the new situa-
tion” (329). Emphasizing the utter normalcy of the laws of time in the 
exotic Mughal Empire and satirizing Orientalist misrepresentations of 
foreign time as no less fanciful than descriptions of “flying monkeys,” 
Rushdie highlights the absurdity and arrogance of believing that a fun-
damentally shared human phenomenon—the experience and regulation 
of temporal rhythms—could be the special province of only one half of 
the world, relegating the other half to a zone of temporal oddity, incon-
gruity, and instability.
 Rushdie’s satire of Orientalist treatments of time in this later novel 
offers a healthy corrective to the critical treatment accorded to time in his 
earlier “clock-ridden” novel, Midnight’s Children. Time, in that novel, has 
consistently been interpreted in the very Orientalist terms that Rushdie 
is satirizing in The Enchantress of Florence. According to this reading, 
Rushdie, resisting the importation of the time of the West, offers instead 
a mythical, static, and timeless version of temporality, uniquely personal 
and culturally distinct from the telos-driven linearity of a Western time 
regulated by clock and calendar. For M. Madhusudhana Rao, the single 
unified concept of time in both Midnight’s Children and Shame is “time-
lessness” (135), which aids in the protagonists’ self-realization as they 
unchain themselves from a “world of history” that has been “spoiled by 
deception and horror” (139). Fantasy is a “timeless world,” Rao writes, 
affording Rushdie “a long distance and telescopic view of life” (140). 
Rushdie’s novels are, for Rao, “meditations on Time, in the manner of 
realizing the world of timelessness.” They generate a “timeless reality,” 
according to which “[h]istory or particular detail is a passing phase” 
(143). Countering the corruption of history with “timeless constructs” 
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of “language, myth and symbol,” Rushdie achieves a “richly spiritual” 
timeless state of “nirvana” (144), where the personal, the symbolic, and 
the subjective combine in opposition to “objective, impersonal histori-
cal reality” (136). Stéphanie Ravillon similarly argues that Rushdie chal-
lenges the linearity of time, capturing instead the “essence of time” by 
creating “fictional spaces where time could stand still” (62). Rushdie’s 
primary object, Ravillon asserts, is to “alter the linear time of the West 
and to find an architecture which might allow the linear model of history 
and the cyclical mode of myth to co-exist” (62). Achieving through fic-
tion the fundamental intransigence and resistant instability of the time 
of the Mundus Novus, Rushdie demonstrates, according to Ravillon, 
that there are “as many conceptions of time as there [are] individuals” 
and that time is “multi-faceted and ever changing” (64). These critics 
suggest that Rushdie, in distinctively “Eastern” fashion, is opposing as 
unwelcome the Western intervention into India of clocks, calendars, 
history and even temporal progression itself. Celebrating the “nirvana” 
of timelessness or forcing a fusion between Western linearity and cyclical 
mythic time, Rushdie becomes the representative of exotic temporali-
ties that are categorically strange and unfamiliar to Western temporal 
regimes. Rather than recognizing a commonality of temporal existence 
for all people, these readings affirm the radical ontological distinction 
between the time of the colonizer and the time of the postcolonial sub-
ject. Ravillon asserts that rather than breaking down such Orientalist 
divisions, Rushdie is in fact expressing a “desire for a partitioned time” 
capable of innumerable appropriations and artistic reinventions (68). 
Far from satirizing the Orientalist partition and segregation of tempo-
ral experience along cultural lines, these critics suggest that Rushdie is 
inhabiting and celebrating a state of temporal exoticism outside of the 
normal rules of temporal progression.
 These studies, I would argue, ultimately tell us more about the curi-
ous persistence of Orientalist conceptions of time in the contemporary 
period than they do about the function of time in Midnight’s Children 
or in Rushdie’s work more generally. For timelessness is neither an ar-
tistic nor a political ideal in Midnight’s Children, nor is it a mythical 
mode of Eastern being; it is rather a dangerous and formless solution to 
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the insistent demands of daily time, hawked by pseudo-spiritual huck-
sters like the Lord Khusro as an easy path to benediction and grace, 
or it is imposed by violence on the central protagonist Saleem, who 
becomes an avatar of Eastern timeless exoticism only after having re-
ceived a temporary concussion by a projectile spittoon during the 1965 
India-Pakistan War at the conclusion of the novel’s second part. This 
temporary derangement of Saleem drives him outside of the linear con-
straints of history and measured time, and he is indeed at that point 
renamed “The Buddha,” a moniker that sticks with him throughout the 
1971 war of Bangladeshi secession. With acid irony, Rushdie suggests 
that Saleem’s unconscious embrace of Eastern mystification is not only 
the result of random and accidental violence (his being brained by the 
spittoon is characterized by Rushdie as the achievement of “purity”) but 
also the means for making him vulnerable to violent appropriation and 
manipulation. While he is in his state of temporal grace, “The Buddha” 
is put on a leash by Pakistani commando forces and used to sniff out 
Bangladeshi rebels and civilians who are then brutally murdered. The 
timeless Buddha’s only use is as a tool for butchering Bangladeshi seces-
sionists who are fighting to achieve historical and political recognition. 
In the “Buddha” sections of the novel and elsewhere, the fantasy of time-
lessness seduces Rushdie’s protagonist away from political engagement 
and away from the transformation and appropriation of the rhythms 
of his life. It is compared to, and certainly not celebrated in favour of, 
other appropriations of and struggles over clock-time, such as those of 
the anarchist Joe D’Costa, who hides time bombs in a broken-down 
clock tower. Indeed, far from partitioning a timeless time of the East 
and celebrating it over the relentless linearity of the time of the West, 
Rushdie breaks down such Orientalist partitions, insisting upon time 
as a common battleground, a heavily contested site of struggle over the 
power to shape and regulate collective rhythms. 
 Orientalist conceptions of the time of the Other have not only per-
sisted but have also arguably fuelled a great deal of polemical energy 
within certain strains of postcolonial theory. Keya Ganguly has sug-
gested that the category of time has all too often been mobilized as a 
bulwark against a European historicism painted as oppressively teleo-
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logical, authoritarian, and exclusionary. In opposition to the “normative 
temporality of clock and calendar associated with Western temporality” 
(162), critics like Homi K. Bhabha have celebrated the non-synchronous 
and uniquely postcolonial temporal experience as a political expression 
of contra-modernity. Such assertions of a fundamental ontological dif-
ference between the time of the postcolonial subaltern and the time 
of the nation or empire, Ganguly argues, may do nothing more than 
“reproduce an old-fashioned nativism about the so-called ‘alterity’ of 
postcolonial cultural practices, couched in terms of non-synchronous-
ness” (173). Ignoring Johannes Fabian’s warnings of the anthropologi-
cal temptation to deny a common temporal existence to geographically 
distant cultures and populations,1 this tendency to romanticize (or, for 
Ganguly, “mystify”) the postcolonial experience of time, ignores the 
possibility of articulating a shared, if historically contingent, experience 
of modernity as a global or intrinsically human process. 
 If critical attempts to champion Midnight’s Children as a document 
of postcolonial temporal Otherness reflect this dominant strand of 
thinking about time within recent postcolonial theory, they also re-
flect much older and more persistent attitudes about the function of 
time within the “classical” tradition of Indian philosophy and cosmol-
ogy as worked out by late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century 
European Indologists, who identified the core principles of “Hindu 
civilization” through their readings of foundational texts such as the 
Dharmaśātra, the Mahābhārata, and the Purāņas. As Romila Thapar 
has argued, Orientalists “generally conceded” that Indian civilization 
lacked both the “sense of history” and “the notion of linear time,” a 
lack distinguishing it from the Greco-Roman tradition and leading to a 
uniquely Indian inability to differentiate between myth and history (4). 
Theorizing Indian time as “entirely cyclic” (4), Indologists represented it 
as diametrically opposed to the linear time of “dialectical change” (4–5). 
In her critique of this Orientalist depiction of Indian time, a depic-
tion that she argues has remained “largely unchanged” over the last two 
hundred years, Thapar demonstrates the ways in which cyclic time in 
the Purānas coexisted with linear and other categories of time in ways 
that were neither mutually exclusive nor incompatible with historical 
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chronology. A vast cosmological sense of time, whereby the period of 
Kaliyuga lasts for over four hundred thousand years, for example, co-
existed comfortably with the practice of dating eras by regnal years, a 
time-reckoning system dating back to the third century BC and based 
on “a precise point of time and the starting point of the reckoning being 
known” (32). Breaking down the dichotomy between the cyclical and 
the linear, Thapar illustrates the extent to which multiple categories and 
conceptions of time-reckoning remain dynamically capable of register-
ing shifting historical functions and priorities, in India and elsewhere. 
The persistent desire to stereotype time in a culture or subculture as 
non-linear and anti-historical, whether from an impulse to condemn its 
naiveté or to praise its political resistance, stultifies and flattens out its 
horizon of possibilities for temporal engagement and action. 
 Such a flattening out of the possibilities for action and engagement is 
one of the unintended consequences of readings of Midnight’s Children 
which insist upon the text’s assertion of an oppositional non-linear 
timelessness. Rushdie’s protagonist struggles to establish the significance 
of his idiosyncratic role within a larger historical narrative of national 
consciousness and political autonomy. His fiery determination to enter 
and alter the progression of historical time, rather than to disavow that 
progression in a gesture of mystical renunciation, was clearly appreci-
ated by early reviewers of the book, albeit in sometimes absurdly hyper-
bolic language, as with John Leonard’s wish, expressed in the New York 
Times that “Rushdie’s children” would “take over the world at dawn.” 
While Saleem’s desire to enter and transform history is fraught with ob-
stacles, not the least of which is the danger that it will manifest itself in 
a totalitarian identification with the state, the novel ultimately embraces 
the struggle to fight for a place within historical time rather than the 
temptation to opt out of that struggle through pseudo-spiritual mysti-
fications of temporal otherness. Such mystifications are dangerous and 
seductive in the novel. They produce little more than a stupefied state 
of temporary shelter, while the progression of historical time continues 
unchallenged and unabated. 
 Saleem’s first experiments with timelessness begin in the womb, 
when he realizes his power to stop clocks and hold time “still as a dead 
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green pond” (141). Yet Saleem recognizes that even though his magic 
has stopped the clock in the local clocktower and made time stand still 
for his mother, it has had no impact on the larger current of historical 
time, which sweeps the subcontinent along to Mountbatten’s partition. 
“[A]lthough baby-weight and monsoons have silenced the clock on the 
Estate clocktower,” Saleem writes, “the steady beat of Mountbatten’s 
ticktock is still there, soft but inexorable, and .  .  . it’s only a matter 
of time before it fills our ears with its metonymic, drumming music” 
(112–113). The stopping of time is only a trick, which fails to generate a 
viable alternative to the British Empire’s plans, a tactic politically as dead 
and stagnant as the pond image Rushdie uses to describe it. The other 
great metaphor for timelessness in Saleem’s early years is the “washing 
chest” or laundry hamper), which he describes as a “hole in the world, 
a place which civilization has put outside itself.” Young Saleem hides in 
the dirty laundry to escape paternal rage, “concealed from the demands 
of parents and history” (177). Yet as with the clock-stopping trick, the 
shelter of the washing chest is only a temporary reprieve from the pres-
sures of history, which intrude onto Saleem’s illusory paradise with the 
“terrible inevitability of soap” (182). 
 If timelessness is a temporary juvenile fantasy, it is also the product of 
an obsessive exoticism of the distant Indian past, exemplified in the fate 
of Dr. Shaapsteker, the European snake-doctor whose escaped cobras 
take refuge inside the broken-down clocktower full of home-made 
bombs. His snakes, interpreted by religious leaders as the arbiters of 
divine retribution against Nehru’s secular nationalism, are symbols of 
an exotic and dangerous antiquity that will rear its head whenever the 
present threatens to deviate from the past. Shaapsteker’s obsessive study 
of these symbols is part of what Saleem describes elsewhere as a larger 
impulse to entertain “atavistic longings” in the face of “democracy and 
votes for women” (281). The end result of this atavistic and exoticizing 
orientation toward India’s past is the creation and maintenance of a gro-
tesque tropical archive. Shaapsteker in his nineties lives in an apartment 
“filled with tropical vegetation and serpents pickled in brine,” a victim 
of his belief in the superstitions of his orderlies, convinced that he is de-
scended from a king cobra (294). Young Saleem wonders what impulse 
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draws him to the deluded old man’s room, where “the sun neither rose 
nor set, and no clocks ticked” (295). Saleem’s later conception of himself 
as pickling the past through his narrative echoes Shaapsteker’s pickling 
of his beloved snakes in an ecstasy of timelessness. If Shaapsteker’s ori-
entation toward the past is distorted, there is no reason to believe that 
Saleem’s pickling of time is any less dubious a project. Certainly, other 
manifestations of exotic timelessness in the novel are no less suspect. 
The transformation of Cyrus into the ageless and timeless deity Lord 
Khusro, who exists “in a time before Time” (306), is nothing more than 
a crass marketing ploy to play on people’s “atavistic longings” for Eastern 
mysticism (306). 
 Less transparent, though, is that other great symbol of timelessness in 
the novel, the Sundarbans, where Saleem and his Pakistani commando 
regiment find themselves during the war of Bangladeshi secession. 
When the young men enter the oppressive maze of the Sundarbans, an 
immense mangrove forest on the border between India and Bangladesh, 
they are driven mad by nightmarish visions of the ghosts of their victims 
and of dangerously voracious female goddesses. The Sundarbans func-
tion as a dark and disorienting exotic wilderness in the novel, devoid of 
moral balance and restraint, much as the jungle does in Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness or the Marabar Caves in Forster’s A Passage to India. The young 
men’s entry into the Sundarbans is effected through a symbolic slaughter 
of time itself, as they shoot a rice farmer whose wife has been raped by 
Saleem. Chasing Saleem with a scythe and thus represented as “Father 
Time,” the innocent farmer is then murdered. This murder eliminates 
everything associated with time in the text: dependable rhythm, conti-
nuity, causality, and teleology, all of those ostensibly “Western” importa-
tions onto the exotic East. “Time lies dead in a rice paddy,” the narrative 
bluntly states, and with it goes any sense of human volition or auton-
omy. Having “murdered the hours and forgotten the date,” Rushdie 
writes, “they no longer know if they are chasing after or running from.” 
The Sundarbans, like Conrad’s jungle or his Placido Gulf in Nostromo, is 
a place into which “history has hardly ever found the way” (413). Were 
the text radically suspicious of a Western linear and teleological time, 
murdering Time and History would seem cause for celebration. Yet in 
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this text, those murders are the catalyst for the characters’ subjugation 
to a ritualized and vampiric goddess Kali. The Sundarbans, where time 
follows the “unknown laws” of “sorcery,” is not an exotic paradise free 
from ticking clocks and calendars but a nightmarish overgrowth of war-
time atrocities which, in causing men to abandon their moral compass, 
also withholds the sustenance of controlled and predictable temporality. 
Even after he has regained his memory and married Parvati-the-Witch, 
Saleem refuses to acknowledge responsibility for his rejection of tempo-
ral structure. “[A] farmer’s wife tempted me,” he writes, “and Time was 
assassinated in consequence” (467). Blaming the victim for the necessity 
to assassinate time, Saleem trots out an alarmingly topsy-turvy sense of 
moral logic, which is precisely what Rushdie suggests is a natural prod-
uct of the timelessness of the Sundarbans.
 If timelessness unsettles the moral as well as the causal logic of events, 
it may nevertheless be a welcome alternative to the rigid temporal preci-
sion and inexorability of the clock and calendar time that constitutes the 
official historical record. The thematic function of midnight and magic 
in the text is, after all, to similarly destabilize and offer invigorating alter-
natives to state-sanctioned and state-regulated temporal management. If 
the 1975 State of Emergency makes the “trains run on time” (499), that 
precision comes at the expense of personal liberties, political dissidence, 
and alternative visions for the future. Those liberties and visions are the 
province not of regular temporal progression but of the messianic and 
magical hour of midnight, which is the hour “reserved for miracles” and 
“somehow outside time” (243). The text’s latent belief in the miraculous 
and magical texture of existence and its celebration of the persistence of 
optimism embodied in little Aadam’s first word, “Abracadabra” may give 
the lie to the argument about timelessness that I have been developing 
here. Despite its inherent dangers and pitfalls, timelessness may still be 
the only avenue to a magical resuscitation of alternative political futures. 
The magicians of the novel, self-ghettoized in time as well as space, are 
conceivably the novel’s only hope for a future outside of the strictly 
managed and measured confines of the clocks and calendars controlled 
by imperial and state authority. Yet precisely because of their temporal 
ghettoization, the magicians succumb to the disease of Dr. Shaapsteker. 
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Castrated and dispersed, the magicians finally fight shadow battles 
inside timeless enclaves no less stultifying and airless than Shaapsteker’s 
room full of pickled snakes. Picture Singh, the leader of the magicians’ 
ghetto and the man on whom Saleem has pinned so many of his hopes, 
ends the novel locked in a timeless and futile snake-charming contest 
within the Midnite-Confidential Club. Saleem, characterizing his life’s 
story in terms of the conventional epic, suggests that his descent into 
the club is the obligatory visit to Hades or Jahanna requisite for any epic 
tale, a “black as hell” place where, significantly, timelessness also signi-
fies loss of memory and the past. “Here you are in a world without faces 
or names,” says the female attendant who welcomes Saleem and Picture 
Singh to the club, “here people have no memories, families, or past; here 
is for now, for nothing except right now” (522; emphasis in original). 
Like the washing chest of his youth, the Midnite-Confidential Club is a 
place “outside time,” a “negation of history” (523). Unlike the washing 
chest, though, there is no accompanying juvenile fantasy of comfort in 
escaping the dictates of temporal precision and the dictates of the past. 
Timelessness is a hell where magicians work their intoxicating spells for 
no conceivable ends and with no lasting effects. 
 For the emancipatory political promise to achieve a real and lasting 
effect, it must avoid the temptation of an exotic and mystified escape 
from the constraints of temporality and re-enter the world of clock, 
calendar, and telos, fighting from within the clocktower, rather than 
from outside it. Indeed, the clocktower itself is a key site of social and 
political struggle in the text, occupied by a series of political pretenders 
to the throne of temporal progression. After baby Saleem silences the 
clocktower, the anarchist Joe D’Costa takes up residence in it, along 
with his “devices of hatred,” an assortment of time bombs. Saleem later 
uses the clocktower to project his telepathic vision of liberal democratic 
harmony to the other midnight’s children until Evie Burns expels him 
from it in a coup of American occupation. It is significant that access 
to the clocktower is controlled by an Indian-made lock. Unlike Saleem’s 
toy globe which is tellingly mislabelled “made as England” rather than 
“made in England,” the lock on the clocktower is a cheap “made in 
India” product which is easily bypassed. If access to the larger sphere 
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of global activity is prohibited because the globe itself is “made as” 
England, the clocktower remains an accessible point of entry into a time 
“made in” India and thus open to counter-appropriation and regula-
tion outside of the dictates of the British Empire. Indeed, much of the 
struggle over clocks in the novel involves an attempt to appropriate and 
harness a temporal progression that measures and regulates not only 
British activity and ideology but also the localized rhythms and activities 
of populations left behind by the “relentless ticktock” of British time. 
Bombay’s time, for Saleem, is “variable and inconstant,” as indicated by 
the Bombay speaking clock’s always being “a few hours wrong” com-
pared to the “relentless accuracy” of Mountbatten’s “English-made” 
ticktock.
 While Saleem entertains the notion that temporal inconstancy might 
be a cultural or linguistic heritage (“no people whose word for ‘yester-
day’ is the same as their word for ‘tomorrow’ can be said to have a firm 
grip on the time”), he equally suggests that temporal inexactitude may 
be less an ontological mark of otherness and more a reflection of an 
inequitable distribution of infrastructural resources. The speaking clock 
in Bombay is inexact because it is “tied to electricity” and thus depend-
ent on the vagaries of poorly distributed third world resources (118). 
If temporal imprecision is ontological, it cannot be changed. If it is 
a result of inequitable distribution, it can be. The fear in the novel is 
not of linear temporal progression itself but rather that this linearity 
will be dictated by corrupt authorities, whose control of the clocks will 
exclude or trivialize a multitude of imperfectly harmonized temporal 
non-synchronicities. This is the tragedy of Saleem’s aunt Aalia, whose 
grandfather clock, because it “kept accurate time but always chimed 
two minutes late,” never has a “chance to strike” before being wiped out 
in the coordinated airstrikes of the 1965 India-Pakistan war (374). As I 
have suggested, the point for Rushdie is not to retreat from the dictates 
of temporal progression into a mystified and valorized timeless stasis 
but rather to appropriate and shape the contours of temporal progres-
sion in order to ensure that they are truly global, chiming just as clearly 
for the non-synchronized places and peoples of the globe as they do 
for imperial and national authorities. Such appropriations of tempo-
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ral measurement happen in the novel, as when Pakistan partitions not 
only space but time by setting its clocks half an hour ahead. While this 
transformation of clock time motivates S.P. Butt, a business associate 
of Saleem’s father, to frantically question the foundation of reality (“If 
they can change the time just like that, what’s real any more?” [87]), it 
prompts another character, Mr. Kemal, to speculate on the possibility of 
a “Time Without Partitions” (86). This, I submit, is the text’s dream as 
well: of a temporal progression without partitions, integrating a diver-
sity of non-synchronous rhythms and temporalities. To put it another 
way, I am suggesting that Rushdie is entertaining the possibility of a 
temporal foundation for global humanism, one that is, as Aimé Césaire 
writes, a “true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the 
world” (73).
 Such a project is fraught with peril, as it clearly is in the text. The 
project of shaping and redirecting the course of history can be driven by 
petty egotism and the drive for power, as is Saleem’s threatening letter 
to Commander Sabarmati, assembled by cutting words and phrases out 
of several different newspaper articles and magazine advertisements and 
described by Saleem as his “first attempt at rearranging history” (298). 
Nonetheless, the text refuses to simply give way to the notion that the 
only alternative to such manipulations of time is to accept its “tergiver-
satory nature” (282) and thus abandon the very notion of linear causal-
ity. As Saleem keeps insisting whenever his narrative strays too far from 
that which can be located, charted, timed, and dated, “there’s no getting 
away from the date” and “[t]he time matters, too”—phrases the text 
repeats a number of times (3, 337, 482). The time, in fact, clearly does 
matter in the case of the midnight’s children themselves, whose magic 
does not derive from a mystical and timeless source but is rather the 
product of a precisely measured synchronicity (“on such a scale [that] 
would stagger even C.G. Jung” [224]). Their powers derive from the 
powers of clock time. Precise midnight on August fifteenth of 1947 can 
have no possible meaning outside of the purely socially and imperially-
constructed meaning granted to it by the clocks at Greenwich. Yet it 
does have meaning in the text, despite the fact that it is a foreign and 
imperial construct. It is the time that independent India has designated 
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as its moment of entry onto the world historical stage. The magic of 
clock time is that we ourselves can make it matter, Rushdie asserts, by 
appropriating its powers through a collective act of will and by reso-
lutely resisting all those who are “pickled in immortality . . . clutching 
Time in their mummified fingers and refusing to let it move” (374–5). 
Without clocks, we are only timeless wanderers in the moral void of 
the Sundarbans. If time got us into this mess, Rushdie suggests, time is 
nevertheless the only way out.
Note
 1 In his book, Time and the Other (1983), Fabian argues that anthropologists 
construct bordered cultural enclaves for their objects of research, denying “co-
evalness” to cultures that are conceptualized as existing in distinctly different 
temporal and spatial frameworks from those of the anthropologist.
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